

Central Intelligence Agency

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
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ATTENTION: RTS-2A [redacted]

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
SUBJECT: Request for Documents

1. This is in response to your July 31, 1986 letter addressed to Ms. [redacted] in which you requested a copy of an unclassified memorandum titled "Communist Military and Economic Aid to North Vietnam, 1970-1974".

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2. The document is attached for your retention. Please note this is the most legible copy we were able to retrieve.

STAT



Deputy Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated



L-233-1R

NIO/

MEMO 750305

March 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Communist Military and Economic Aid to North Vietnam, 1970-1974*

1. The Intelligence Community has been requested to estimate the amounts of Communist aid delivered to North Vietnam in the years 1970-1974, using current US dollar costs of the materiel and services provided (see Table I). It is important to recognize that the Intelligence Community's estimate on this subject is not equivalent to -- and hence not comparable with -- US appropriations for military and economic aid to South Vietnam, for the following reasons:

(a) On the matter of accuracy, our information on North Vietnam has always been incomplete, although coverage on civilian imports is substantially better than for military aid. The draw-down of the US presence in Southeast Asia has further limited intelligence collection capabilities in the area, so that current information on North Vietnam is less comprehensive than it was formerly. In particular, on the question of Communist military aid, our information base is very spotty. Hence we know we are seeing only part of the picture on military aid, and our estimates for the part we cannot see have a wide margin of error.

(b) Military aid to North Vietnam is focused on materiel required for the type of military action undertaken by the Communist forces in South Vietnam -- i.e., selected attacks from sanctuaries at times and places of their choice. US military aid to South Vietnam supports a different military mission -- defense of scattered communities, large agricultural areas, and lines of communication, plus reaction and reinforcement of local forces after Communist attack. As the total

This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and concurred in by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

forces for the different missions differ in size, so do their requirements for assistance. Throughout the war, South Vietnam's forces have been roughly twice the size of North Vietnam's forces in the South, primarily because the missions of South Vietnam's forces -- protecting population and holding territory -- have required a much larger and widely dispersed military structure.

(c) The GVN has therefore also required a combat air force and an ability to redeploy forces rapidly by ground and air transport. Thus, the types of equipment supplied to South Vietnam by the US have been more sophisticated and therefore more expensive than those required by Hanoi. South Vietnam also requires considerably more logistic support.

(d) In addition, shipping, overhead, and other support costs of military aid to the GVN are substantially more than support costs of Communist aid to North Vietnam because of the greater distance involved and other factors. (See Table II at annex.)

2. Several conclusions may nonetheless be drawn with respect to levels of military and economic assistance to North Vietnam from 1970 through 1974.

(a) Total Communist military and economic aid to North Vietnam in 1974 was higher (in current dollars) than in any previous year.

(b) The suspension of US air bombardment in North Vietnam at the beginning of 1973 brought about a large decrease in assistance for defense against such bombardment or to replace losses caused by it (e.g., air defense equipment, missiles, trucks, etc.).

(c) The US disengagement from combat and the reduction in the level of hostilities in South Vietnam in 1973 were reflected in a substantial decrease in the amount of ammunition and ground force equipment received by North Vietnam, compared with 1972.

(d) In 1974, the delivery of ammunition to Hanoi markedly increased over 1973 and reached a level as high as that of 1972, although deliveries of ground force equipment continued at relatively low levels.

* The dollar figure shown in the table for ammunition deliveries in 1974 is considerably higher than that for 1972, but tonnages were about the same. Higher ammunition prices explain the difference.

(c) Economic aid was reduced in 1972 with the closure of North Vietnamese ports, but with their reopening rose sharply in 1973 and reached a record level in 1974. The economic aid increase in 1974 was further spurred by typhoons which damaged the 1973 North Vietnamese autumn rice harvest, the inflation of dollar values in 1974, and the increased pace of reconstruction during 1974.

3. The figures leading to the above conclusions are shown in Table I. They give a rough order of magnitude of Communist military assistance to North Vietnam and a somewhat more precise indication of economic aid. Within the category of military assistance, the estimates of deliveries of equipment and materiel (\$275 million in 1974), as well as the estimate for transportation equipment (\$25 million in 1974), are fairly good. Even a more complete data base would produce estimates of the same relative magnitude. This is not true, however, for those items listed under the "other military-related support" heading, where the lack of hard data makes our estimates subject to wider margins of error.

4. It should also be noted that in the final analysis what is significant is not so much the level of military assistance but the relative balance of forces on the battlefield in South Vietnam. North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, supported by record stockpiles of military supplies, are stronger today than they have ever been. The Communists are expected to sharply increase the tempo of the fighting in the next few months. Given the present military balance in the South, the GVN's forces will not be decisively defeated during the current dry season. At currently appropriated levels of US military assistance, however, the level of combat that we anticipate in the next few months will place the Communists in a position of significant advantage over the South Vietnamese forces in subsequent fighting.

TABLE I

ESTIMATED COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM

	Million Current US\$				
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974b/</u>
MILITARY	<u>205</u>	<u>315</u>	<u>750</u>	<u>330</u>	<u>400</u>
Military Equipment and Materiel	140	240	565	230	275
Air Defense Equipment	20	85	310	100	55
Ground Forces Equipment	45	80	110	40	45
Ammunition	70	60	130	85	170c/
Other	5	15	15	5	5
Military Transportation Equipment (Trucks, helicopters, transports)	20	15	30	35	25
Other Military-related Support ^{d/} (Delivery and packaging costs, Spare parts, POL for the mili- tary, Technical Assistance and Training, Medical Supplies)	45	60	155	65	100
ECONOMIC	<u>735</u>	<u>755</u>	<u>465</u>	<u>670</u>	<u>1,295</u>
Commodity Shipments ^{e/}	635	645	360	540	1,145
Food	65	60	80	170	420
Fertilizer	10	15	5	5	25
Petroleum	10	10	5	15	55
Machinery, Transport Equipment, & Metal Products	240	175	125	165	345
Other	310	385	145	185	300
Technical Assistance (includes cost of foreign technicians in NVN and NVN training abroad)	100	110	105	130	150
TOTAL OF ESTIMATED COMMUNIST GOODS AND SERVICES PROVIDED TO NORTH VIETNAM	940	1,070	1,215	1,000	1,695

**ESTIMATED COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM
(Continued)**

	Million Current US\$				
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
TOTAL OF ESTIMATED COMMUNIST GOODS AND SERVICES PROVIDED TO NORTH VIETNAM (repeated from last page)	940	1,070	1,215	1,000	1,695
LESS - NORTH VIETNAMESE EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES^{1/}	50	50	30	80	125
TOTAL ESTIMATED COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM	890	1,020	1,185	920	1,570

^{1/} Because of rounding, individual figures do not always add to the totals in this table.

^{2/} The data for 1974 are preliminary.

^{3/} Although ammunition supplied to North Vietnam in 1974 constituted an estimated 40 percent of its military aid, our data regarding probable ammunition costs per ton are admittedly "soft." Therefore, if our price estimates are off by, say, 10 percent, the total value for ammunition alone could fluctuate by some US \$17 million.

^{4/} The lack of hard information on the items included under "Other military-related support" makes these estimates subject to a wider margin of error than exists for other categories of military assistance to North Vietnam.

^{5/} For economic goods, the cost of transportation is included in the cost of the goods as shown in the table. (For military goods, delivery and packaging costs are included under "Other military-related support.")

^{6/} Since North Vietnamese exports in these years paid for some of North Vietnam's imports, we have subtracted them to derive our estimates of Communist aid to North Vietnam.

TABLE II

COMPARISONS OF MAJOR CATEGORIES OF COMMUNIST
MILITARY AID TO NORTH VIETNAM AND US AID
TO SOUTH VIETNAM

In Million \$US and Percentages

	Communist Military Aid Delivered to North Vietnam CY 1974	US Military Aid So Far Ap- propriated to South Vietnam FY 1975
<u>Total Military Aid^{b/}</u>	<u>400 (100%)</u>	<u>700 (100%)</u>
Military Equipment and Materiel	275 (69%)	268 (38%)
Air Defense Equipment	55 (14%)	-- (negl.)
Ground Forces Equipment	45 (11%)	-- (negl.)
Ammunition	170 (43%)	268 (38%)
Other	5 (1%)	-- (negl.)
Military Transportation Equipment	25 (6%)	-- (negl.)
DELIVERY COSTS	20 (5%)	74 (11%)
OTHER MILITARY-RELATED SUPPORT (Including Spare Parts, POL for the military, Technical Assistance and Training, Medical Supplies, and Miscellaneous Costs)	80 (20%)	358 (51%) ^{c/}

The reasons explained in the text, our figures for Communist aid to North Vietnam (some of which are soft estimates) are not readily comparable with US aid appropriations for South Vietnam. Also, the data on Communist aid is kept on a calendar year basis while US aid appropriations are keyed to a Fiscal Year cycle. The above table, however, gives a rough indication of the way the two aid packages compare in CY 1974 for Communist aid and FY 1975 for US aid.

^{c/} Totals may not add because of rounding.

The reason for the wide disparity is a charge against the US aid account for administrative expenses for the DAO in South Vietnam which has no counterpart on the Communist side. There are also other items for which counterparts on the Communist side are available, such as oil, maintenance servicing of military equipment, and construction.

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14. REQUEST STATEMENT (LIST DOCUMENT/PHOTO NUMBERS IN SEQUENCE; MAXIMUM OF 10 DOCUMENT NUMBERS)						
<p><i>NEO/ MEMO 750305</i></p> <p><i>FIN memo 3 Nov 75</i></p> <p><i>Communist military and economic aid to North Vietnam 1970-1974</i></p>						
15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/PRIORITIES/COMMENTS (INCLUDING REQUESTER REACTION)						
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*Interagency Intelligence Memoranda
Communist Military & Economic Aid to North
Vietnam, 1970-74 dtd 3 Mar 75*

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31 JUL 1986

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SUBJECT: Unclassified Search

1. Please search your holdings for an unclassified memorandum titled "Communist Military and Economic Aid to North Vietnam, 1970-1974", dated 5 March, 1975, CIA/DIA as the author. The memorandum is probably produced for the DCI.

2. Enclosed is a copy of the New York Times article that may mention the document.

3. Please send information to:

Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: RTS-2A
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4. Thank you for your assistance.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

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Chief, Reference Library Branch
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L-233-1R

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

SARCOM, South Vietnam, Friday, March 28 (AP) — Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, United States Army chief of staff, arrived today in Saigon to assume for President Ford the deteriorating military situation including the loss of much of South Vietnam's territory to the North Vietnamese.

Arriving on the same military aircraft was the United States Ambassador, Gen. A. Marshall Anderson, born in Wisconsin.

BANGKOK, Thailand—The Indian Government has sent a peace mission to help solve the problems of the Chakma people in Bangladesh. The mission, led by a senior official, is expected to arrive in Bangladesh soon. The mission's task is to investigate the situation of the Chakma people and to propose a solution to the problems. The mission is expected to stay in Bangladesh for several weeks.

PRINCIPAL **PRINCIPAL**
Asian states have
drawn their
realizations that
soon follow.
of Malaysia and
of the capital in
together with
the rockets struck
the compound
The Thai
was recalled to
security
recent weeks
and cable check.
The continued
recent weeks
on activities
embassy, and
Governor and a
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appeared to be
and Government
Asian ambassadors.
The
displacement
the flight of
slipping than Hah
ground of talks
would also
The busy
Nol was prepar
weekend to Ku
scade beach

The New York Times

LATE CITY EDITION

Weather: Partly sunny, with clouds.
Temperature: High today 55-60;
Low today 35-40; Tomorrow 45-55;
Wednesday 55-60; Thursday 55-60; Friday 55-60.

NEW YORK, FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1975

20 CENTS

Ford Says Israel Lacked Flexibility in Negotiations

In Interview, President Seems to Chide
El Aviv for Collapse of Kissinger's
Effort to Achieve a Sinai Accord

By BERNARD GWEITZMAN

WASHINGTON, March 20—President Ford today seemed to chide Prime Minister Golda Meir for the collapse of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's latest administration effort to achieve a Sinai accord. Mr. Ford said that the Israelis had not shown the flexibility in negotiations that he believed was necessary for a successful outcome.

Although Mr. Ford stopped short of actually blaming Israel for the collapse of Secretary of State Kissinger's latest administration effort to achieve a Sinai accord, he seemed to chide the Israelis for their lack of flexibility in negotiations.

The interview was conducted shortly after Mr. Ford's arrival in Washington from his trip to Israel. He was accompanied by William French Smith, his personal secretary.

The interview took place less than 24 hours after Mr. Kissinger's return to Washington from his trip to Israel. He was accompanied by William French Smith, his personal secretary.

Publicly, Mr. Kissinger has said there should be no attempt to blame the Israelis for the collapse of his mission. But privately he would have been the best insured and aided against such a possibility.

Morton, in a Cabinet Shift, Picked for Commerce Job

By BEN A. FRANKLIN

WASHINGTON, March 20—President Ford today announced a major reshuffle in his cabinet, naming William French Smith as his personal secretary and appointing William French Smith as his personal secretary.

The White House announced Mr. Ford's appointment of William French Smith as his personal secretary. Mr. Smith had previously served as Mr. Ford's personal secretary.

Mr. Smith had previously served as Mr. Ford's personal secretary. He was appointed to the position of personal secretary to the President.

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Americans asking crew of an Air America C-46 to take aboard more South Vietnamese refugees. Page 6.

Localities Seeking Tax Rises as U.S. Is Preparing Cuts

By WILLIAM F. FARRELL
Searing inflation, shrinking federal aid and growing demands for public services are forcing many of the nation's city and suburban officials to seek increases in local taxes at a time when the federal government is declining to cut taxes.

In some areas public employees are being laid off to reduce the need for even higher tax rates. In others, officials are trying to avoid layoffs and politically unpopular rises in the property tax.

The financial pinch on the local level means that for many individuals, the benefits of federal tax reduction could be quickly nullified by increases in local taxes. Mayors and other local officials meanwhile feel that the values are being pushed to the limit.

Other local officials meanwhile feel that the values are being pushed to the limit. They are seeking ways to increase local revenues.

They are seeking ways to increase local revenues. Some are considering raising property taxes.

Some are considering raising property taxes. Others are looking for other sources of revenue.

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Some are considering raising property taxes. Others are looking for other sources of revenue.

COMMUNIST FORCE IS SURGING SOUTH; DA NANG HOLDS ON

Airlift Is Reported Halted as
Refugees Throng Runway
—2d Coast City in Peril

CLAMOR RISES IN SAIGON

Group Led by Ky Calls for
a New Government, but
With Thieu Staying In

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 20—The North Vietnamese advance, slowed yesterday along the central coastal plain of South Vietnam.

Behind it virtually all of the northern part of South Vietnam had been engulfed, with only the enclave of Da Nang, South Vietnam's second largest city, remaining in the hands of Saigon Government forces.

This morning, as thousands of refugees streamed out of Da Nang, the city's airport was jammed with thousands of people.

The airport was jammed with thousands of people. Many were fleeing the city.

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21,800 MORE ADDED U.S. Says Arms Situation In Vietnam Is Not Critical

TO STATE JOBLESS
February Rate Put at 9.6%
—Apparel Work Gains Cuts
City's Unemployment

By MICHAEL STERN
WASHINGTON, March 20—The Bureau of Labor Statistics today reported that the unemployment rate in February was 9.6 percent, an increase from 9.3 percent in January.

The increase was due to a rise in the number of people seeking work. The number of people seeking work rose from 1.8 million in January to 1.9 million in February.

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Arabs and Iranian Students Increasing at U.S. Colleges

By EDWARD B. FINK
WASHINGTON, March 20—The number of Arab and Iranian students at U.S. colleges and universities is increasing, according to a report by the State Department.

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Dip in Oil Imports Brings A Record Trade Surplus

By EDWIN L. DALE JR.
WASHINGTON, March 20—The United States today reported a record trade surplus of \$1.1 billion for February, the first time since 1961 that the country has had a trade surplus.

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